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Abstract 
Permit trading as an instrument to control air pollution has already been 
implemented in several countries, so in Europe since 2005. Could this instrument, 
however, also be adequately used for water pollution control of river basins in form of 
a water quality trading? Specific characteristics of rivers, pollutants and pollution 
sources strongly influence the design of such an instrument. This paper reviews 
theoretical and practical approaches on water quality trading. It is surprising that 
these approaches have never been linked by the literature. To fill this gap, this paper 
gives a first idea, how different water quality trading approaches (in theory and 
practice) can be made comparable. 
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Permit trading as an instrument to control air pollution has already been 
implemented in several countries, so in Europe since 2005. Could this instrument, 
however, also be adequately used for water pollution control of river basins in form of 
a water quality trading?
2 
This paper starts with a short presentation of the relevant characteristics of rivers, 
sources and pollutants (chapter 2), because these characteristics crucially influence 
the design of a permit trading system. The paper then reviews theoretical and 
practical approaches to water quality trading (chapter 3 and 4). The theoretical 
approaches are mainly based on models for air pollution control. The analysis of 
implemented permit trading systems (practical approaches) focuses on the often 
cited „Tar Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program, North Carolina, U.S.“ and on the 
innovative „Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme, New South Wales, Australia“. For 
a better understanding, a short overview of the institutional framework in these 
countries will be given. 
It is surprising that theoretical and practical approaches on water quality trading have 
never been linked by the literature. To fill this gap, this paper gives a first idea how 
these approaches can be made comparable. This will be the basis for the further 
research work, by which the author will develop a guideline that, depending on the 
defined quality objectives and the characteristics of the relevant river basin and its 
sources and pollutants, will be able to criticise existing theoretical and practical 
approaches on a consistent and standardised basis. Moreover, this guideline will 
offer the opportunity to examine whether the introduction of a new water quality 
trading system for a certain river basin is reasonable. If this holds, this guideline will 






                                                 
1 This paper has been presented at the Kieler Nachwuchsworkshop „Umwelt- und 
Ressourcenökonomik“, IfW Kiel, 20.-21. February 2006. The author is indebted to Andreas J. Schmidt 
for very useful comments. Furthermore I would like to thank Nadine Kalwey for her support. 
2 For the general discussion about the advantages of a permit trading over other environmental 




2 Water Pollution Control: Relevant Factors  
2.1 Sources 
In managing river basins two potential sources of pollution have to be taken into 
account: on the one hand, point sources, for example industrial facilities or sewage 
treatment plants. They discharge their pollutants at a fixed and well identifiable point 
into the river (Shortle and Horan, 2001, p. 256). The discharges of these point 
sources can therefore be precisely measured; the assignment of individual 
accountability for the pollution is possible. 
On the other hand, nonpoint sources, for example agriculture, do not discharge the 
pollutants at a precise point into the water. The emissions are thus not exactly 
measurable (Shortle and Horan, 2001, p. 256). It is not possible to assign individual 
accountability for the resulting pollution. That is the reason for not integrating 
nonpoint sources in the discussion of this paper; the assignment of permits to 




Depending on their specific characteristics, discharged pollutants influence water 
quality in a different way, which in turn influences the adequate design for an 
instrument. Therefore, one has, on the one hand, to distinguish between assimilative 
and accumulative pollutants (Tietenberg, 1985, p. 15). In the case of assimilative 
pollutants, the medium has a certain capacity to absorb these pollutants; they do not 
accumulate.
4 Accumulative substances can not be absorbed and thus do 
accumulate over time.
5 
                                                 
3 Even if modern technologies can precisely predict the impact of different activities (for example in 
agriculture) on the ambient pollution level of a river concerned, the precise individual assignment of a 
defined share of the resulting ambient pollution at a certain point in time is impossible. A permit 
trading can not be introduced on a clear individual level for nonpoint sources.  
But: this does not mean that nonpoint sources should be excluded from any environmental regulation. 
On the contrary: considering the high share of pollution and the relatively low activities of abatement, 
strong economic incentives for nonpoint sources to abate are required. 
4 The absorbing capacity for assimilative substances may be different in space and time, i.e. for a 
different intensity of use, regional or local specifications etc. (Kemper, 1993, p. 71). Exceeding the 
capacity, the substances take over the characteristics of accumulative substances and should be 
treated as such (Kemper, 1993, p. 71). 
5 Kemper (1993, p. 77) states that in the case of assimilative substances, which biodegrades, current 
emissions are responsible for damages, i.e. immission loads, at present. All future damages depend 
only on future emissions, not on the present ones. Thus, different time periods can be examined 
independently. Marianne Keudel: Water Quality Trading 
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On the other hand, pollutants can be classified by their degree of mixing in the 
medium: uniformly mixed pollutants spread quickly and uniformly throughout the 
medium, non-uniformly mixed pollutants do not disperse quickly.
6 While the former 
are of global relevance, the latter are rather of local relevance. 
The following table shows classification examples for different substances. Relevant 
for this paper are non-uniformly mixed assimilative substances in the water medium. 
 
Substances  Uniformly mixed  Non-uniformly mixed 
accumulative (CO2, (air))
7  heavy metals (water) 
assimilative GHG  (air)  Sulfur dioxide (air), 
nutrients, salt (water) 
Table 1 – Substances (own compilation based on Tietenberg, 1985, pp. 14). 
While the extent and spatial pattern of damage caused by uniformly mixed pollutants 
(assimilative or accumulative) depends only on the level of emissions, this does not 
hold for non-uniformly mixed pollutions. The extent and the spatial pattern of damage 
are affected by the level of emissions, but also by the location and the dispersion 
characteristics, i.e. the distribution in the medium, of the emissions. This has to be 
taken into account when designing a water quality trading system. 
2.3 The River itself 
This paper focuses on the environmental management of rivers.
8 In contrast to lakes, 
rivers are flowing water bodies. This has to be taken into account when thinking 
about the introduction of a water quality permit trading. In contrast to CO2 control, the 
point in time and the location of discharges are of crucial relevance; the problem of 
hot spots has to be addressed. In addition, rivers are characterised by different water 
levels and flow rates over time. This, as well as different temperature levels at 
different times, results in varying assimilative capacities for pollutants. 
                                                 
6 For the definition see Tietenberg (1985, pp. 14). Uniformly mixed pollutants can be controlled by an 
emission-based system; time and location of the emission do not matter. Non-uniformly mixed 
pollutants call for an ambient-based control system; depending on time and location of the emission, 
the impact on the ambient pollution level is very different. 
7 CO2 is originally characterised as an assimilative pollutant. The actual amount of CO2 in the 
atmosphere exceeds the assimilative capacity of the air medium and thus becomes accumulative. 
8 Out of the scope of this paper are coastal waters or other inland waters such as lakes; due to their 
different characteristics, an individual discussion of environmental instruments is required. Also 
groundwater is not explicitly treated in this paper. But an increasing quality of surface water, here 
rivers, automatically leads to a higher quality of the groundwater (and to a limited extent of coastal 
waters as well). Nevertheless, additional, individual instruments need to be introduced for these water 




If ecological effectiveness should be reached in all parts of the river and at every 
point in time, the cap, i.e. the maximum emission or immission load, should be 
formulated in detail for each river basin. Any instrument to be introduced to achieve 
this ecological effectiveness
9 has to be flexible in the sense that it can deal with – 
eventually changing – restrictions (and thus changing caps) in time, quantity and 
location of discharge.
10  
3 Theoretical Approaches 
In the following, different permit trading models for non-uniformly mixed assimilative 
pollutants will be presented. In the literature, models for these pollutants do mostly 
apply to air pollution. They are nevertheless shortly presented, because the following 
water specific model bases on these air pollution models. 
All these models base on the central mechanism of a permit trading: each source 
has to hold permits for the pollutants it discharges into the environmental medium 
(air or water). When reducing its discharges, a source can sell the surplus of permits; 
when increasing its discharges, a source has to purchase permits from other sources 
to cover these additional emissions. The total amount of emissions allowed is 
determined by the total number of permits distributed in the system. 
Depending on the location of the sources, the discharge of different sources can 
have different impacts on the immission load, i.e. the environmental quality of the 
medium at a specific point. If this holds, a one-to-one trade of permits between these 
sources could affect the ecological effectiveness of the system in a negative way. To 
avoid this, one could introduce so-called trading ratios for all transactions between 
sources. A trading ratio determines by how much source 1 has to decrease its 
discharges if source 2 wants to increase its discharges by one unit, purchasing 
permits from source 1. A 2:1 trading ratio for example means that source 1 has to 
abate two units if source 2 increases its emissions by one unit. This would be the 
case if one unit of source’s 1 discharge has a weaker impact on the environmental 
quality at a specific point than one unit discharged by source 2. The system can thus 
guarantee for a constant environmental quality level, i.e. immission load.
11 
                                                 
9 For reasons of cost-effectiveness this strong interpretation of ecological effectiveness may not hold 
for all cases. 
10 Additionally, any instrument to be introduced should be able to deal with the requirements in the 
river basin concerned. This becomes especially relevant if the river basin comprises many countries 
of different characteristics as this is the case for the Danube River Basin. For more details see NIRAS 
(2004). 
11 The application of a trading ratio of course influences the price of the concerned permit. Marianne Keudel: Water Quality Trading 
 
6 
The models can roughly be subdivided into zonal and non-zonal approaches 
applying trading ratios set endogenously or exogenously. Zonal approaches divide 
the environmental medium into zones; quality standards can then be set for each 
individual zone separately. Other models use receptor points: a mesh of receptor 
points is installed; the quality standard (immission) has to be achieved at these 
points.
12 
If a trading ratio applies, it can be fixed ex ante, i.e. exogenously, or it can be derived 
by the model, i.e. endogenously. Most of the models are immission-based, i.e. the 
environmental quality level should be influenced by the permit trading. Other, 
however, are emission-based, i.e. the rate of emissions should be affected by the 
model; and thus, the immission load is not directly affected by the model. Trading 
ratios are only relevant in the case of immission-based models. An emission-based 
model does not account for the resulting immission load; different impacts of 
emissions on the water quality between trading sources are not assumed to be a 
problem. 
3.1 General Approaches 
Montgomery (1972): Ambient Permit System (APS) 
Montgomery (1972) was the first to develop a theoretical approach for a permit 
trading with non-uniformly mixed assimilative pollutants reflecting spatial 
considerations of damages.
13 In his Ambient Permit System (APS) Montgomery 
mentions a model with n industrial sources of pollution and m  receptor points in the 
river.
14 The ecological objective is immission-oriented.
15 Each source needs to cover 
its discharges with permits, which can be traded between sources. The total amount 
of permits is defined by the required water quality standard (immission load). 
An environmental authority defines water quality standards (immission loads) of one 




m q q Q = , 
                                                 
12 A broader definition could even include zones as one type of receptor points.  
13 Montgomery (1972) formulated his theoretical approach for air as well as for water. The specific 
case chosen by Montgomery for analysis is air-related: he mentions a smoke plume from an elevated 
source emitting at a constant rate with a wind of constant direction and speed. The simplification of a 
wind constant in direction and speed might be adequately transferred to the case of a river, where the 
water transports the pollutants in a constant direction with constant speed. 
14 These sources are fixed in location and owned by independent, profit-maximising firms. 
15 Montgomery also proposes a so called Emission Permit System (EPS) with emission-based 
permits. Because EPS has both theoretical a practical problems, it will not be considered in the 
analysis that follows (for further discussion see Krupnick et al. (1983) or Hung and Shaw (2005, p. 






j q  ( ) ,..., 1 m j =  is the determined water quality standard (immission load) of 
the pollutant at receptor point  j .
16 Each of the sources ( ) ,..., 1 n i =  emits a single 
pollutant at the rate  i e , which can be shown by an emission vector  ) ,..., ( 1 n e e E = . As 
the emissions of the sources have, e.g. depending on their location, different impacts 
on the water quality, i.e. the immission load, this emission vector will be mapped into 
water quality levels (immission loads) by a matrix H , so that  Q H E = ⋅ . The matrix 
















ij h H  shows how one unit of emissions from source i affects the 
water quality (immission load) at receptor point  j .
17 The elements of the matrix 
ij h are thus called dispersion coefficients. 
The 
* Q , set by the environmental agency, defines the water quality standard 
(immission) constraint which should not be exceeded, i.e. 
* Q H E ≤ ⋅ . In 
Montgomery’s model, the dispersion coefficients of the matrix H  are taken as 
exogenously defined trading ratios for transactions between sources. The trading 
ratio reflects that emission discharges of different sources could affect the water 
quality in a different way. Additionally, a non-degradation principle applies. This 
disallows any lowering of water quality in any part of the river, even if this quality 
level is higher than the water quality standard would require. 
 
Montgomery arrives at the conclusion that a competitive equilibrium exists and 
corresponds to the cost minimum attainment of a set of predetermined water quality 
standards. Krupnick et al. (1983, p. 240), however, demonstrate that the market 
equilibrium coincides only with the cost-minimum solution if the initial allocation of 
                                                 
16 For the case of air,  *
j q  could be an annual average immission load of sulphur dioxide at the 
receptor point  j  in an air basin. For water pollution control,  *
j q  might be a measure of annual 
average immission load of nutrients at the receptor point  j  on a river. 
17 Montgomery mentions a model with only one relevant pollutant. If the desired air quality in terms of 
one pollutant concerned is independent of the desired air quality of any other pollutant, nothing is lost. 
This problem could be generalised by adding constraints representing emission vectors which 
achieve desired levels of many pollutants and joint production of pollution. This problem then is to be 
solved in the same way as the one-pollutant system developed here (Montgomery, 1972, p. 398). 
Furthermore, Montgomery assumes that all prices (except those associated with pollution) are 
unaffected by measures undertaken to control pollution, which is a common assumption in economic 
analysis of environmental problems (Montgomery, 1972, p. 398). Marianne Keudel: Water Quality Trading 
 
8 
permits makes the water quality standard, i.e. a pollution constraint, binding at all 
receptor points. The required water quality standard at any receptor point  j  is not 
binding if the initial allocation of permits set by the environmental authority results in 
a higher water quality, i.e. a lower immission load, than the allowable level set by the 
water quality standard. Under the non-degradation principle the water quality at the 
receptor point can not be less than under the initial allocation; the water quality 
standard will not become binding. The least-cost solution, however, can only be 
reached if the initial allocation of permits is set such, that the water quality standard 
is binding at all receptor points; only in this case all trading potentials can be 
exhausted (for a more detailed discussion see Krupnick et al. (1983)). Hung and 
Shaw (2005, p. 84) argue that this is usually unattainable, which would mean that the 
cost-minimum solution can not be achieved. The non-degradation principle is thus 
quite restrictive in an economic sense and causing inefficiencies.  
Furthermore, the Ambient Permit System (APS) causes high transaction costs: when 
increasing or decreasing discharges, a source should obtain or sell permits for each 
receptor point affected. Thus, for each receptor point a single market establishes; 
sources need to hold and to manage a portfolio of permits. 
The exogenous, i.e. beforehand, and fixed determination of the trading ratios will 
cause additional transaction costs.
18 Furthermore, the mesh of receptor points needs 
to be fine enough to avoid too high local pollution (hot spots); but the number of 
receptor points also influences the level of transaction costs. 
The free riding problem, occurring in other models (see below), seems to be 
avoided: all discharge permits are allocated to individual sources; a source can 
increase its discharges only if it purchases an adequate amount of additional 
permits. No potential for free rider behaviour exists. 
Krupnick et al. (1983): Pollution Offset System (POS) 
Based on their own criticism against Montgomery’s Ambient Permit System (APS), 
Krupnick et al. (1983) developed a so-called Pollution Offset System (POS) for air 
pollution control.
19 The permits held by the sources confer the right to discharge 
pollutants; but the permits are not associated with a particular receptor point or 
                                                 
18 ...which will be lower than in other models where trading ratios have to be determined 
endogenously. 
19 In this approach, new sources have to purchase permits from other sources to “offset” the effects of 
these additional emissions in such a way that the pollution constraint is everywhere satisfied. 




market as under the Ambient Permit System (APS). Sources can obtain permits from 
the environmental authority as long as a beforehand environmental model simulation 
shows that the proposed transaction will not cause a violation of the environmental 
quality standard at any receptor point. If this transaction will cause a violation of the 
predefined standard at any receptor point (i.e. the receptor becomes binding), the 
sources have to trade applying a trading ratio equal to the ratio of the two sources’ 
dispersion coefficients, which indicate how the environmental quality (immission 
load) at the receptor point is influenced by the discharge of pollutants of the 
concerned sources (see above, Ambient Permit System). These trading ratios are 
endogenously given by the simulation model (Hung and Shaw, 2005, p. 85). 
To avoid the inefficiencies of Montgomery’s model, no non-degradation principle 
applies under the Pollution Offset System (POS); the model thus allows increasing 
discharges at any point as long as the simulation model shows that the quality 
standard will not be exceeded at any receptor point, and this, even if it lowers the 
beforehand quality at any receptor point. Consequently, the quality standards are not 
all and not always binding. 
 
Krupnick et al. (1983) demonstrate that this model comes to a least-cost solution 
independently of the initial allocation of permits.
20 Furthermore, the sources are only 
concerned with those receptor points whose quality would violate the quality 
standard due to an increase in emissions. This lowers the transaction costs 
compared to the Ambient Permit System (APS), under which sources need to hold a 
portfolio of permits, because each receptor point establishes a single market. On the 
other hand, a high number of receptor points might be required to avoid hot spots, 
causing high transaction costs. Furthermore, the beforehand simulation causes high 
transaction costs; the impact on all other receptor points and thus sources has to be 
analysed before every transaction. The trading ratio is not known until the sources 
are not obliged to apply one, which creates uncertainty about the required abatement 
activity and the price of the permits. Førsund and Nævdal (1998, p. 404) underline 
that the endogenous definition of the trading ratio is very complex and causes, if ever 
feasible, too high transaction costs. 
                                                 
20 McGartland (1988), however, shows that the cost minimum solution under the POS will be achieved 
only if all potential gains from trade are exhausted (McGartland, 1988, p. 36). Certain conditions, e.g. 
perceived uncertainty among sources, too high transactions costs, may prevent the system to reach 















Figure 1 – Dispersion Characteristics, Air (McGartland, 1988, p. 39). 
The main problem of the Pollution Offset System (POS) is the occurrence of a free 
rider effect due to the fact that sources can always obtain additional discharge 
permits if they do not violate the quality standard. Assume that pollutants discharged 
by source 1 affect the quality at the receptor point A, E, and F (Figure 1). Suppose 
that source 1 purchases permits from source 2 (affecting common receptor point A) 
and source 5 (affecting common receptor points E and F); consequently, source 2 
and 5 reduce their discharges. The mentioned trade will improve the environmental 
quality at receptor point B, due to the abatement of source 2, even though source 1 
is not directly concerned. Other sources affecting receptor point B, e.g. source 3, will 
benefit: they can increase their discharges contributing to the quality at receptor 
point B  at no cost, if the quality standard is not violated; they are free riding
21 
(McGartland, 1988, pp. 39; Klaassen, 1996, p. 55). 
Førsund and Nævdal (1994): Exchange Rate System (ERS) 
A third model, developed by Førsund and Nævdal (1994), has originally been 
developed for the abatement of SO2, i.e. air pollution control: the Exchange Rate 
System (ERS), a non-zonal and rather immission-oriented approach. A fixed and 
exogenously set “exchange rate” that applies at any transaction between sources 
reflects regional differences in the impacts of discharges and thus corresponds to a 
trading ratio as defined above. Under the ERS, no testing of violation at the receptor 
                                                 
21 Krupnick et al. (1983) argue that the efficient solution would be to integrate the concerned sources 
(affecting B) in the bargaining process. This could, however, become a very complex target if more 




points before transactions is necessary: trades are allowed as long as the exchange 
rate (trading ratio) applies (Førsund and Nævdal, 1994, p. 309). The exchange rate 
equals the ratio of the sources’ marginal abatement costs in the optimum, i.e. the 
least-cost solution (Førsund and Nævdal, 1998, p. 309). Førsund and Nævdal 
assume that the marginal abatement costs differ for the sources depending on their 
dispersion coefficient related to the binding receptors: depending on the impact that 
discharges of a certain source have on the environmental quality (immission load), 
the abatement activity required to achieve a better environmental quality will vary, 
thus causing different marginal abatement costs. 
The exogenous definition of the exchange rate lowers the transaction costs. No 
simulation has to be done before each single transaction as under the Pollution 
Offset System (POS). But: the cost-minimum solution and the individual marginal 
abatement costs should be known in advance to calculate the exchange rates 
(trading ratios). Førsund and Nævdal (1998, p. 310) remark, that for the case of SO2 
this information is available. This might not be the case for other substances and 
other environmental media. This might thus, if ever feasible, cause high transaction 
costs in form of high information costs.
22 Additionally, Førsund and Nævdal note 
themselves that only for specific initial allocations the exchange rate (trading ratio) 
can be defined such that it guarantees for an efficient result (Førsund and Nævdal, 
1998, p. 409). 
Finally, the definition and application of exchange rates (trading ratios) for 
transactions between sources integrates an immission-based view; it can not 
guarantee for the avoidance of hot spots; exchange rates reflecting the ratio of the 
marginal abatement costs can not guarantee for ecological effectiveness, i.e. 
compliance with the quality goal (immission load). Therefore this approach can not 
be unambiguously classified as immission-based. 
3.2 A Water-specific Approach 
Hung and Shaw (2005): Trading Ratio System (TRS) 
Hung and Shaw (2005) argue that the main aspects of the theoretical approaches for 
the medium air hold for water pollution control. The medium water, however, has at 
least one characteristic that makes the design of the trading scheme vary: while 
pollutants emitted into the air disperse in many directions, the pollutants discharged 
                                                 
22 See also Hung and Shaw (2005, p. 98). Marianne Keudel: Water Quality Trading 
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into rivers always flow to the lowest level uni-directionally. This property influences 
the design of a water quality trading system enormously. 
The so called Trading Ratio System (TRS) of Hung and Shaw (2005) represents a 
zonal approach: the river basin is divided into n zones (
+ ∈ N n ).
23 Hung and Shaw 
(2005, p. 86) assume that the dispersion characteristics of effluents and the 
environmental impact within a zone are very close. For transactions between these 
zones, trading ratios apply, which are exogenously determined and equal the 
dispersion coefficient and thus reflect the impact of individual discharges on the 
water quality level (Hung and Shaw, 2005, p. 89). These trading ratios are 
promulgated ex ante. 
The environmental authority sets a Zonal Total Load Standard  j E  for each zone.
24 
This determined emission load guarantees for a certain water quality standard 
(immission load). The environmental authority defines zonal effluent caps one by one 
from the upstream to the downstream zones “such that the zonal emission cap is 
equal to the zonal total load standard minus the emission load transferred from the 
upstream zones” (Hung and Shaw, 2005, p. 87). In the following, the caps are 
converted into their equivalent amounts of Zonal Tradable Discharge Permits ( j T ), 
which are defined in terms of their original zonal locations. The first zone obtains 
discharge permits equal to the Zonal Total Load Standard,  1 1 E T = . The zones 
following downstream obtain permits depending on the Zonal Total Load Standard 









k kj j j T t E T .
25  kj t  is the dispersion coefficient, indicating the contribution that one 
                                                 
23 For simplification the zones are ordered by location and only one representative discharger is 
located in each zone. 
24 Hung and Shaw (2005, p. 86, fn 6): “Note that it is not necessary for the water quality standard and 
the total load standard to be the same for each zone and all the time. The environmental authority 
could, for example, prescribe more stringent water quality standards and total load standards in 
densely populated areas and protection areas of drinking water sources, or more lenient total load 
standards during seasons in which the assimilative capacity of the river is stronger.” 
25 Assume that  j k < ; i.e. zone k  is an upstream zone to zone  j . In some cases the downstream 
zone may be a critical one; in this case the pollution load transferred from the upstream zone is higher 
than the zonal total load standard  j E  for this zone. Thus, the cap in the upstream zone needs to be 
stronger. Analytically, this means that if  j E j E j j t > − − 1 ) 1 ( , the zonal tradable discharge permit for the 




unit of discharge from zone k  makes to the total load in zone  j , and equals the 
trading ratio, indicating by how much a source in zone  j  can increase its discharges 
if it purchases one unit of  k T  from any other discharger. 
 
Hung and Shaw (2005) argue that the Trading Ratio System (TRS) avoids the 
problems of the trading approaches mentioned above; they demonstrate that the 
TRS is cost-effective and achieves the given environmental quality standard with the 
least total marginal abatement costs for any initial allocation.
26 Benefiting from the 
uni-directional nature of water pollution, the cap setting strategy of the TRS is able to 
set binding standards for each zone: the upstream permit fully accounts for its impact 
on downstream zones (Hung and Shaw, 2005, p. 88). This guarantees for an 
efficient market solution, avoids local concentrations (hot spots) and avoids that 
sources need to hold a portfolio of permits as under the Ambient Permit System 
(Montgomery), which in turn lowers their transaction costs (Hung and Shaw, 2005, p. 
88). Further on, the trading ratio is defined exogenously, which lowers the 
transaction costs in comparison to the Pollution Offset System (POS) determining 
the trading ratio endogenously. Finally, all discharge permits are allocated 
individually, an increase in emissions obliges the sources to purchase permits; no 
free riding behaviour occurs. 
3.3 Results 
Hung and Shaw (2005, p. 100) developed a scheme for a classification of 
(theoretical) trading schemes, which could give a first idea about a valuation of 
different trading schemes. Table 2 shows how the theoretical approaches would be 
integrated in the scheme. At first glance, one could assume that the water specific 
approach of Hung and Shaw surpasses the other theoretical approaches: the 
transaction costs are, also due to the exogenous trading ratio, lower, no hot spot or 
free riding problems do occur and the quality standard is easy to set as binding. 
                                                                                                                                                        
zonal tradable discharge permits correspond to  ∑
−
=
− − = −
2
1 ) 1 ( 1
j
k k T kj t j j t j E j T  and are thus set 
stronger to guarantee for the water quality standard in zone  j . 
26 The compliance will be controllable by monitoring the emissions  j e  of each source. The emissions 
discharged into the river should be equal to or lower than the zonal tradable discharge permit plus the 











i k ik T kj T ki t i T i e  (Hung and 
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This classification gives only quite general information about the trading schemes. 
To give one example: the level of transaction costs alone can not tell us anything 
about the efficiency of the system. The absence of central elements of a permit 
trading can lower the transaction costs, but at the same time they might reduce the 
efficiency of the system. Additional criteria have to be taken into account when 
intending to give a well-founded and comparable analysis of a theoretical or practical 
permit trading approach (see below). 
4 Practical Approaches: Case Studies 
Theoretical approaches presented in the literature do rarely refer to already 
implemented water quality trading schemes (practical approaches) and the other 
way around. It thus would be interesting to have a look on the practical approaches 
and to link them to the theoretical ones. 
For a better understanding of the case studies in the USA and in Australia, an 
overview of the institutional framework of each country will be given before the 
trading schemes themselves will be presented.  
4.2 Tar Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program, USA 
4.2.1 Institutional Framework – USA 
The general framework for the US water policy is set by the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
from 1972.
27 The goal of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters“ (Sec 101 (a) CWA). Sec 101 (a) 
assigns well defined targets, like the abatement of specified pollutants and the 
                                                 
27 Here: CWA as amended on 2002. 
Table 2 –Theoretical Approaches (Hung and Shaw, 2005, p. 100). 
Trading 
Systems 
Effects        





Hot Spots  Free Riding  Environmental 
Constraint 
APS  Exogenous  High  Yes  No  Difficult to set   
as binding 
POS  Endogenous  High  Yes  Yes  Easy to set  as 
binding 
ERS  Exogenous  High  Yes  No  Difficult to set   
as binding 
TRS  Exogenous  Lower  No  No  Easy to set  as 




development and implementation of programs for nonpoint sources, to each State. 
Sec 101 (d) determines that the US Environment Protection Agency (US EPA) 
administrates the CWA, unless otherwise noted. Sec 102 (a) precises that the US 
EPA should in cooperation with the States and the organisations concerned prepare 
and develop programs to avoid, reduce and abate the pollution. 
The US EPA plays an important role in implementing the CWA. The US EPA Policy 
Statement from 2003 recommends explicitly using innovative approaches like a 
permit trading to achieve the predetermined water quality standard.
28 The US EPA 
argues that the introduction of a permit trading would reach given environmental 
standards in a more flexible and less cost-intensive way than traditional approaches. 
This instrument would set economic incentives for innovations and for voluntary 
abatement measures.
29 The US EPA refers to experiences gathered from already 
existing permit trading systems in the USA.
30 
It is thus not surprising that permit trading is often used for water pollution control in 
the USA.
31 A critical analysis of some of these programmes, however, shows, that a 
permit trading in the original definition does not exist. Only rarely permits are really 
traded. This could create the impression that this is, at least in some cases, due to 
the given design of the system. The example of the Tar Pamlico Nutrient Trading 
Program shows how important the specific design of the permit trading scheme is for 
the effectiveness and the efficiency of the system. This example has been chosen, 
because it is often mentioned as a success in the literature, and therefore a good 
information basis is available.
32 But: it is surprising that rarely an author analysed this 
programme from an economic point of view.
33  
                                                 
28 US EPA (2003, p. 1). 
29 US EPA (2003, p. 2). 
30 For more information on the US institutional framework see Keudel and Oelmann (2005). 
31 For an overview of the trading systems see Breetz et al. (2004), Kraemer et al. (2004) or 
Environomics (1999). 
32 See for example the website of the N.C. Division of Water Quality (http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/ 
tarpam.htm, January 2006). 
33 For an exception see Hoag and Hughes-Popp (1997), Kerr et al. (2000), Keudel (2005) or Keudel 
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Figure 2 – Tar Pamlico Trading Program 
4.2.2 The Trading Scheme 
The Tar Pamlico River is situated in North Carolina (USA). The agriculture along the 
river is responsible for a high share of the river pollution; but also point sources such 
as sewage treatment plants contribute to it (Faeth, 2000, p. 15). In 1989, the North 
Carolina Environmental Management Commission (EMC) declared the river as 
„nutrient sensitive“ water. To decrease the level immission load, the Nutrient Trading 
Program was implemented in 1990, which spans the whole river basin. This trading 
programme includes point sources as well as nonpoint sources; traded pollutants are 
phosphorus and nitrogen (nutrients). According to the theoretical approaches, the 
Tar Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program could be classified as a non-zonal, rather 
immission-based trading scheme, applying an exogenous trading ratio for trades 
between point and nonpoint sources. The major part of the point sources is 
integrated in the so called Tar Pamlico Basin Association. The system treats point 
sources in this Association as one single unit, with the goal to reach the given water 
quality standard, i.e. immission load (cap), within the Association at a higher level of 
cost-efficiency. When exceeding the cap (the predetermined immission load), the 
Association has to pay a so called „incentive fee“ for each unit of pollution exceeding 




beforehand – agricultural fund set up by the state (Agriculture Cost-Share Program 
(ACSP)) to finance abatement measures according to the Best Management 
Practice (BMP) at the nonpoint source level. Additionally, the Association can 
purchase permits from nonpoint sources. But point sources can not sell permits to 
nonpoint sources. For transactions between point sources and nonpoint sources, a 
trading ratio applies, taking into account the fact that the impact of emission 
reductions at the nonpoint source level on the water quality (immission load) can not 
be accurately predicted. Figure 2 gives an overview of the system. 
4.2 Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme, Australia 
4.2.1 Institutional Framework – Australia 
The political structure of Australia is a federal one, consisting of the Commonwealth 
with its States and Territories. While the national level has competences in foreign 
trade relations, defence and migration affairs, States and Territories are responsible 
for all other political fields, so the environmental policy. As especially environmental 
issues are often of cross-border relevance, the Australian environmental policy is 
characterised by a certain number of bi- and multilateral agreements. Also, the water 
policy consists of numerous guidelines on the national level and bi- and multilateral 
agreements between States and Territories.  
As the HRSTS controls the salinity of the Hunter River, the Australian agreements on 
salinity are of relevance. On the national level, the National Action Plan for Salinity 
and Water Quality is of importance; bi- and multilateral agreements between States 
and Territories implement this plan. In New South Wales the NSW Salinity Strategy 
provides the basis for salinity control. This strategy requires the determination of 
targets (water quality, immission loads) and efficiency of the measures; the 
environmental authority does not, however, recommend a specific environmental 
instrument, like the US EPA does. Water quality trading schemes are rare in 
Australia; one of them is implemented in the Hunter River basin. 
4.2.2 The Trading Scheme 
Following, the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (HRSTS) will be presented. 
This example is selected due to its outstanding structure: in an impressive manner 
the system integrates special characteristics of the Hunter River as well as of the 
substances concerned. Marianne Keudel: Water Quality Trading 
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In the region of the Hunter River, the agricultural sector is of high importance. Also, it 
is a home to more than 20 coal mines and to three power stations (NSW EPA, 2003, 
p. 3). The critical substance in this river is salt. Salt occurs naturally in many of the 
rocks and soils of the Hunter Valley and thus in the river. But by introducing saline 
water, sources as coal mines and power stations contributed to an increasing salinity 
in the river (HITS, 2004; NSW EPA, 2003, p. 3). Consequently, the water could not 
be used any more for irrigation in the agriculture (NSW EPA, 2003). This led the 
NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC) and the NSW 
Environment Protection Authority (NSW EPA) to introduce the HRSTS, a system 
with dynamic and tradable discharge permits.
34 According to the theoretical 
approaches, the HRSTS is a non-zonal immission-based approach; no trading ratio 
applies. 
River monitoring has shown that at the beginning of a high flow period („event“, see 
broken line, Figure 3) salinity of the water increases strongly for a short while, 
followed by a strong decrease (see continuous line, Figure 3).
35 The idea behind the 
system is the following: licensees can introduce saline water in the moment in which 
the impact on the water quality is – because of the high volume of fresh water – the 
lowest possible (HITS, 2004). While in low flow periods no emissions are allowed, 
they are allowed (according to the permits) in periods of high flow using the „window 
                                                 
34 After a pilot phase the HRSTS was finally implemented in December 2002. The basic document is 
the Regulation of the Environmental Operations (Hunter River Salinity Scheme) Regulations 2002 
(NSW DEC, 2004). 
35 The additional amount of water washes salt from the ground and surface out in the river. The 
following volume of fresh water diminishes the salinity of the water (HITS, 2004). 
Figure 3 – Salinity and water flow, HRSTS (NSW EPA, 2003, p. 6) 












of opportunity“ (NSW EPA, 2003, p. 4).
36 The allowed amount of emissions (cap) 
depends on the actual salinity and can be changing every day (dynamic discharge 
permits).
37 
The total amount of allowed emissions is defined for „blocks“ (see Figure 4). A block 
is „a body of water that flows down the Hunter River and that is predicted to pass the 
[...] reference point in a 24-hour period“ (NSW EPA, 2002, Division 1, 9, 2).
38 These 
blocks represent a volume unit of water that is flowing through the river bed from the 
origin up to the estuary. The water flow as well as the salinity is measured for each 
individual block (HITS, 2004). Based on these data, the amount of salinity which can 
be introduced additionally (the cap) is defined (NSW EPA, 2003, p. 4; NSW EPA, 
2002, Division 1, 9). In consequence, the application of this system requires an 
intensive monitoring system.
39 Also on part of the licensees, a precise monitoring is 







Figure 4 – Trading in blocks, HRSTS (NSW EPA 2003, p. 5) 
In total 1000 permits have been allocated. Each permit allows the licensee – and this 
is another particularity of the system – to introduce 0,1 percent (!) of the total amount 
of emissions allowed for a defined block into this very block (HITS, 2004; NSW EPA, 
2003, p. 5). Licensees can trade these permits (tradable discharge permits) for a 
single block or for sequential blocks.
40 
 
                                                 
36 For the exact definition of the terms „high flow“ and „low flow“ see NSW EPA (2002, Part 2, Division 
11-14 and Part 3, Division 1, 17). 
37 In a period of flood, saline water can be emitted without permits (Brady, 2004, p. 11; NSW EPA, 
2003, p. 4)). 
38 In total there are 365 blocks per year which are numerated per day and year. 
39 Monitoring points select information for the whole length of the river. Every 10 minutes, data on the 
water flow and the salinity of the water are collected and transmitted via radio or telephone to the 
central data warehouse. River modelling experts use these data to calculate the total emissions 
allowed (NSW EPA, 2003, p. 7). 
40 Each trade has to be approved by the EPA (HITS, 2004; NSW EPA, 2002, Part 5, Division 2, 56). 
Permits do not expire upon use (NSW EPA, 2001, p. 37). For further information about the trading of 
















The scheme of Hung and Shaw (2005, p. 100) mentioned above implicitly provides 
first information about the evaluation of a trading scheme. But it is not detailed 
enough to give a well-founded recommendation. To give a first idea, the practical 
approaches are, however, integrated in this scheme (Table 3). 
According to the scheme, the Tar Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program would be 
integrated as follows: for transactions between point sources and nonpoint sources, 
an exogenous trading ratio, fixed beforehand, applies. For transactions within the 
group of point sources, no trading ratio applies. The transaction costs for the 
determination of the trading ratio are thus relatively low. The major part of 
transaction costs probably arose during the implementation of the system (Hoag and 
Hughes-Popp, 1997, p. 257). The current transaction costs for the point sources 
when trading with nonpoint sources are – compared to a „real“ trading – relatively 
low. Transaction costs for example occur for monitoring, but do not occur for 
searching a trading partner and the determination of the permit price (information 
costs), as the incentive fee is paid directly into the agricultural funds and no direct 
trading takes place. The lower level of transaction costs is due to the absence of 
central trading elements, which overcompensates the effect of lower transaction 
costs (see below). 
Table 3 – Tar Pamlico Trading Program (based on Hung and Shaw, 2005, p. 100) 
Trading 
Systems 
Effects        




Hot Spots  Free Riding  Environmental 
Constraint 
APS  Exogenous  High  Yes  No  Difficult to set   
as binding 
POS  Endogenous  High  Yes  Yes  Easy to set  as 
binding 
ERS  Exogenous  High  Yes  No  Difficult to set   
as binding 
TRS  Exogenous  Lower  No  No  Easy to set  as 
binding 
Tar Pamlico  PS: 1:1 
PS-NPS: 
Exogenous 
Lower Yes  Yes  No  binding 
cap 




The system sets one cap for all sources; neither for the cap nor for the trading rules, 
a differentiation in time or place applies. The system thus risks the occurrence of hot 
spots. 
The main criticism against the Tar Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program is that the cap 
for the point sources is not allocated individually; point sources thus are not able to 
trade with each other (see Keudel, 2005, p. 298). This absence of an individually 
allocated cap causes inefficiencies by offering the possibility of free riding behaviour 
within the group of point sources.
41 Within the group of nonpoint sources no 
mechanism exists to make the abatement of pollution obligatory for all sources; this 
can also lead to free rider behaviour. Finally, the determined cap is not a binding 
one. This can prevent the system from coming automatically to a cost-effective 
solution. 
As the discussion about the Tar Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program shows, the 
scheme of Hung and Shaw (2005) does not give enough information for a complete 
(and comparable) analysis of trading systems. An economic analysis for the Tar 
Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program, for example, shows that the common criteria 
(ecological effectiveness, cost-efficiency, level of transaction costs) are not fulfilled.
42 
Furthermore, other criteria, such as ecological ones, and the interrelation between 
these, need to be defined to guarantee for a well-founded and standardised analysis. 
 
According to the scheme of Hung and Shaw (2005, p. 100), the HRSTS can be 
classified as follows. No trading ratio applies; the permits are traded at a one-to-one 
basis. The different impact of the emissions depending on the local position of the 
sources is indirectly presented in the permits by a time component: the permits apply 
to blocks, which are defined in a combined time and space unit. 
Probably, the major part of the transaction costs arises from monitoring, including the 
computer systems installed and the auction processes. The salinity and the water 
flow have to be monitored at many monitoring points as well as in short intervals and 
must then be promptly communicated to the sources.
43 To guarantee for a sufficient 
information flow, computer programmes have been installed. On the one hand, the 
                                                 
41 Richard Gannon, Nonpoint Source Planner NC DWQ, email 12.08.2004. The emissions are 
monitored at the individual source level and the introduction of an individual fine has been considered. 
It has never been put into action. In consequence, „some smaller facilities have been ,free-riding’ the 
entire time“ (Richard Gannon, Nonpoint Source Planner NC DWQ, email 24.08.2004). 
42 For a detailed analysis see Keudel (2005) or Keudel and Oelmann (2005).  
43 These costs are indirectly financed by the sources: the auction revenue as well as contributions 
from the licensees are used for financing. Marianne Keudel: Water Quality Trading 
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sources thus receive detailed information about potential actual discharges.
44 On the 
other hand, these systems allow for online trading. Thus, a trading partner can be 
quickly identified. The installation of these information systems finally prevents an 
extreme increase in transaction costs for point sources. 
The HRSTS avoids the risk of hot spots: the cap for each block is updated 
permanently depending on the actual flow and salinity characteristics and is well 
defined in space and time. The defined maximum level of salinity can not be 
exceeded in any part of the river. No free rider behaviour will occur: the permits are 
allocated individually, the discharge processes are well defined, and the standards 
are binding in every point in time and at any place. 
This classification only gives a first idea about the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
the HRSTS. An economic analysis assigns high efficiency and effectiveness to the 
HRSTS.
45 But: as for all approaches represented here, other aspects might be 
relevant to give a well-founded, complete, and comparable judgement of the HRSTS. 
5. Conclusion 
Different theoretical and practical approaches on water quality trading exist; but they 
have rarely been linked in the literature. Without a standardised and complete criteria 
catalogue it is not possible to compare these different systems and to formulate 
recommendations for specific cases. More information on the specific characteristics 
of the river concerned, the pollutants, the ecological goals etc. need to be integrated 
in the design of a water quality trading. By her research, the author tries to fill the 
gap in the literature. Keudel (2005) as well as Keudel and Oelmann (2005) already 
give an economic and ecological analysis on practical approaches (Tar Pamlico and 
HRSTS), which extends the criteria catalogue mentioned by Hung and Shaw (2005, 
p. 100). Without a well-founded criteria analysis, no reasonable comparison of 
different approaches or even the selection of the adequate instrument design is 
possible. In her further research, the author will develop a consistent and 
standardised guideline to allow criticising existing theoretical and practical 
approaches. This guideline will offer the opportunity to examine whether the 
introduction of a new water quality trading system for a certain river basin is 
                                                 
44 “DLWC monitoring of weather reports, rainfall in the catchment, streamflows, instream salinity 
levels and surface conditions (wet or dry) allows the timing and extent of high flow events to be 
predicted“ (HITS, 2004). 




reasonable. If this holds, it will be able to formulate precise requirements for an 
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